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NOTES
10(b). Such a rule could define the terms of the Section by using a scheme of
liability in which a higher standard of scienter would be applied to
defendants like Ernst & Ernst in the instant case than to corporate represent-
atives and others upon whom greater reliance is placed by shareholders. 4'
However, absent SEC rulemaking or congressional legislation, the courts
must now continue the search for a uniform scienter standard.
William Deryl Medlin
PURELY COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP To THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In 1942, the decision of Valentine v. Chrestensen' began what was
later to become known as the commercial speech doctrine. From its initial
pronouncement the doctrine was consistently invoked to reject first amend-
ment attacks upon regulation of speech in a business context.2 However, in
recent years the commercial speech doctrine has become subject to increas-
ing criticism3 and was eventually overruled in Virginia State Board of
41. By promulgating such a rule, the SEC could maximize the remedial goals of the
securities laws and at the same time avoid any impingement on the "logical growth of
regulation of the securities market." Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579,
592 (5th Cir. 1974). For example, parties charged with the full and complete disclosure
of corporate information, such as the accounting firm in the instant case, should be less
amenable to suit so that the flow of information would continue. On the other hand,
persons who more directly influence the decision of persons to buy and sell securities,
and who have access to crucial information, should be held to a higher standard of
performance. Other policy matters are considered at note 19, supra, and are equally
relevant to the determination of the proper standard of culpability.
I. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211-12 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1972) ("The [commercial speech
doctrine] is supported by an unbroken line of authority from the Supreme Court down
which distinguishes between the expression of ideas protected by the first amend-
ment and commercial advertising in a business context."); Chrestensen v. Valentine,
122 F.2d 511, 517-26 (2d Cir. 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting) (articulating the reasons
for relegating purely commercial speech to unprotected status); Note, 23 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1258, 1264 nn.31 & 32 (1974).
3. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 n.6 (1975); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 393, 398, 401 (1973)
(three separate dissents); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429
(1971); Note, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640 (1976).
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Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.4 This note will attempt
to analyze the commercial speech doctrine and to demonstrate that its
repudiation was an unwarranted and potentially troublesome judicial act.
In Valentine v. Chrestensen5 the Supreme Court found that a New
York City ordinance prohibiting the distribution of "commercial and
business advertising matter" on city streets did not violate the first amend-
ment.6 After declaring that such an ordinance would not be allowed to
prohibit speech "communicating information" or "disseminating opin-
ion," the Court concluded that "the Constitution places no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising." 7 The doctrine that
developed from this decision simply holds that purely commercial speech is
not protected by the first amendment.
Perhaps the primary criticism of the commercial speech doctrine is that
there are no objective criteria for identifying purely commercial speech.8
Naturally, if these claims are correct the doctrine would be untenable. But
Supreme Court decisions, while admittedly less than clear, indicate the
presence of certain discernible elements of purely commercial speech.9
Post-Chrestensen decisions have been described as applying two
distinct commercial speech tests. 0 In the earlier decisions the Court is said
to have required that the primary purpose of an activity be commercial
before placing the attendant speech in the purely commefcial category. This
primary purpose test is thought to have been replaced by a test that went
4. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). This decision was an extension of recent judicial efforts
to more clearly define unprotected categories of speech. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel against public figures); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity).
5. 316 U.S. 52. Chrestensen sought to distribute handbills soliciting customers
for a submarine tour. Upon being told that such distribution violated a city ordinance,
he printed a double-faced handbill which included the commercial solicitation on one
side and a protest against the city dock board on the other. The Court found that
Chrestensen could not be allowed to circumvent the law by appending protected
speech to his otherwise commercial circular.
6. Id. at 54.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1827 (1976); Redish, supra note 3, at 430-32; Note, 23
DEPAUL L. REV. 1258, 1266 & n.45 (1974); Note, 24 EMORY L.J. 1165, 1187 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254(1964); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
10. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 3, at 451; Note, 44 CINN. L. REV. 852, 854, 855
& n.22 (1975); Note, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640 (1976); Note, 42 TENN. L. REV. 573
(1975).
[Vol. 37
NOTES
beyond the commercial nature of an advertisement by identifying protected
expression in its content. Under this test if an otherwise commercial activity
were found to contain a wealth of non-commercial protected speech it would
not be relegated to unprotected status.II
While the aforementioned tests do provide relatively helpful descrip-
tions of what the Court considered in classifying purely commercial speech,
they are misleading as indications that the Court actually changed the
criteria by which such speech was distinguished. In reality, since the
inception of the commercial speech doctrine, Supreme Court decisions have
indicated that purely commercial speech consists of two distinct elements. 12
First, the communication must be primarily commercial, that is, it must
primarily involve the solicitation of purchases or contributions. Thus an
advertisement which solicited funds but primarily "communicated infor-
mation, expressed opinion, recited grievances, [and] protested claimed
abuses . . ." was found to be protected speech." Secondly, the speech
must take place in a business context in order to be classified as purely
commercial. For example, primarily commercial activity that ordinarily
would be classified as purely commercial speech has been placed outside the
purview of that category when the activity was promoted by a religious or
other non-profit organization.' 4
Accordingly, the Court found speech to be purely commercial only if it
primarily involved the solicitation of purchases or contributions for an
enterprise whose main purpose was to make a profit. While a more precise
definition is clearly desirable, in practice". . the problem of differentiat-
ing between purely commercial and other communications has not . . .
proved to be a serious one."' 5 Moreover, it is important to note that the
renunciation of the commercial speech doctrine has not solved any problems
that may exist in distinguishing purely commercial speech. Since the Court
has not held that purely commercial speech is subject to full first amendment
protection, 16 such speech will still have to be distinguished in order to
I1. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. See note 9, supra.
13. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
14. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (These cases found
that otherwise permissible regulation of door to door solicitation could not be applied
to religious groups.); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(One important factor in the Court's finding that the advertisement was protected by
the first amendment was the non-business quality of the promoting organization.).
15. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 948-49 n.93 (1963).
16. 96 S. Ct. at 1830 & n.24.
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determine the degree of protection applicable. 17
The remaining question is whether, under the preceding definitibn, the
commercial speech doctrine is supported by the first amendment. Although
no precise theory regarding the scope of the first amendment has ever been
agreed upon, 8 protection of the dissemination and reception of ideas' 9 and
opinions20 rank as two of the most commonly articulated purposes of the
first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression. In addition the
purposes of the amendment have often been viewed as including the
protection of information important to self-government. 2'
Proponents of first amendment protection for purely commercial
speech generally have not suggested that such speech involves the expres-
sion of ideas or opinions but have emphasized its qualities as a distributor of
factual information.22 Their basic contention is that factual information
regarding private economic decisions is important to self-government and
therefore any regulation which inhibits the dissemination or reception of
such information violates the first amendment. 23 While this argument may
be appealing to supporters of the current consumer movement, 24 it is not
consistent with the jurisprudence and doctrine most often cited in support of
the proposition that information necessary to make governing decisions is
protected by the first amendment. 25 These opinions referred to information
of a much higher order than that which simply relates to private economic
17. Id. at 1838 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. Emerson, supra note 15, at 877.
19. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
20. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372'(1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
21. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964), and
cases cited therein (expression, including information, on governmental issues); A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)
[hereinafter cited as MEIKLEJOHN]; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Abso-
lute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245 (1961).
22. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1827 (1976); Redish, supra note 3, at429; Note, 81 YALE
L.J. 1181 (1972). But see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 398 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (employment advertise-
ments express ideas and opinions).
23. See note 22, supra.
24. See, e.g., Preface to B. MURRAY, CONSUMERISM: THE ETERNALTRIANGLE-
BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND CONSUMERS at ix (1973) (policies encouraging market
structures and pricing that deviate from the competitive norm are currently under
attack by the consumer movement).
25. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269-70 (1964), and cases
cited therein; MEIKLEJOHN at 94-104.
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concerns. The term "important to self-government" was viewed as restrict-
ing protected factual information to that which concerned the advisability of
a statute or the wisdom of a particular policy.2 6 Accordingly, under this
traditional analysis the first amendment would protect communications
regarding the desirability of regulating purely commercial speech rather
than information provided for the primary purpose of soliciting purchases.
The latter category of information was seen as related "to a separate sector
of social activity involving the system of property rights rather than free
expression."27
Thus the commercial speech doctrine was not only reasonably well-
defined, it was consistent with established views on freedom of expression
and the first amendment. Perhaps in light of the current tendency to restrict
the traditionally unprotected categories of speech28 these conclusions alone
would not be sufficient reason to continue to apply the doctrine. However,
the commercial speech doctrine additionally served an important purpose in
preventing judicial intervention in economic regulation. 29 Like the deferen-
tial due process30 and equal protection 31 approaches, the commercial speech
doctrine kept economic theory out of the Constitution by reserving
economic decisions for appropriate legislatures.
26. See note 25, supra. Accord, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973) ("We emphasize that nothing in our
holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and
distribute advertisements commenting on the ordinance, the enforcement practices
of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preferences in employment.").
27. Emerson, supra note 15, at 948-49 n.93.
28. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (offensive language); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel against public figures).
29. Compare Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969),
with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96
S. Ct. 1817 (1976). See also Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So.2d
681 (Fla. 1969); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-a-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d
242 (1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487
(1971). (These three decisions applying an interventionist substantive due process
approach, which has been abandoned by the federal courts, closely parallel Virginia
Citizens in both approach and result.).
30. See, e.g., North Dakota Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156
(1973); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
(1952); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Semler v. Oregon State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
31. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v.
Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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An examination of the decision which overruled the commercial
speech doctrine clearly illustrates the doctrine's role in preventing unwar-
ranted judicial intervention into the economic sphere. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,32 plaintiff
consumers sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement
of a Virginia law barring pharmacists from advertising prescription drug
prices. The Supreme Court found that even though such advertisements
were purely commercial speech they were still protected by the first
amendment .33 The Court then concluded that the statute was invalid because
state interests in prohibiting this type of speech were insufficient when
balanced against the "substantial individual and societal interests" in
publishing and receiving price information.
34
At a minimum this decision will require every regulation of purely
commercial speech 31 to be justified by a substantial state interest.31 In order
to determine whether such a state interest exists, courts, relying upon their
preconceived notions of what a state's economic policies should be, will
have to weigh competing interests and thereby judge the wisdom of
legislative economic regulations. 37 While such an approach may initially be
applauded for producing desired change more quickly than the legislative
32. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
33. Id. at 1826.
34. Id. at 1828-30.
35. E.g., LA. R.S. 37:1225(1I) (Supp. 1974) (prohibits pharmacists from adver-
tising prescription drugs); LA. R.S. 37:1063(9) (Supp. 1974) and R.S. 37:1065 (1974)
(prohibits the advertisement of optical services and prices by opticians); LA. R.S.
37:775 (Supp. 1974) (bans advertising of prices and services by dentists); LA. R.S. 37,
ch. 4, app.; ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASs'N (Supp. 1976)
(adopts ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101, which prohibits
most forms of advertising by attorneys).
36. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817, 1828-30 (1976). The "substantial individual and societal interests" in
the free flow of price information could not be overcome by anything less than an
equally substantial state interest in regulating such information. While certain
advertising bans may come closer than others to meeting this requirement, 96 S. Ct. at
1831 n.25, none of these regulations will be exempt from judicial determination of
their substantiality and their corresponding constitutional status. Id.
37. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1835 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,488
(1955); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Stephensen, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Change: Lochner v. New York
Revisited, 21 VILL. L. REV. 217 (1976). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, 530 (1965)
(Black and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
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process, according these economic policy decisions constitutional stature
may eventually prove to impede rather than aid development in the
economic area.
38
Allowing legislatures to make economic policy determinations is
undoubtedly a more flexible method of decision making than the constitu-
tional adjudication rendered necessary by the renunciation of the commer-
cial speech doctrine. The wisdom of the prior method should not be ignored
in an attempt to more speedily attain a currently desirable result. For if that
result should prove to have been ill advised, any benefit derived from the
speed with which the result was initially achieved will be more than offset
by the burdensome process by which it must be changed.
In the due process area, where the Court first attempted to require more
than a rational state interest in economic regulation, 39 the interventionist
approach was found totally unworkable. ' For several years substantive due
process prevented the natural evolution of economic theory by allowing
courts to impose their economic views upon legislatures.4 This approach
was finally abandoned by the federal courts 42 and replaced by a deferential
due process test, created in recognition of the impropriety of judicial
intervention in economic matters. 43
Only a reinstatement of the commercial speech doctrine can prevent
problems similar to those created by the application of substantive due
process to economic matters from being repeated in the first amendment
area. If courts seize upon the doctrine's abandonment as an opportunity to
invalidate economic regulations which they feel are improper or unwise,
significant barriers to solutions of economic problems will result."4 Should
38. Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV
L. REV. 1, 12 (1959) "The man who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate
result may not, however, realize that his position implies that the courts are free to
function as a naked power organ, that it is an empty affirmation to regard them, as
ambivalently he so often does, as courts of law. . . . [T]his type of ad hocevaluation
is, as it has always been, the deepest problem of our constitutionalism. .. ".
39. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897).
40. See note 30, supra.
41. See note 39, supra; Stephensen, supra note 37.
42. E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Some state courts continue to invalidate economic
regulations on substantive due process grounds. See, e.g., Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Sav-a-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971).
43. See note 30, supra.
44. See note 37, supra; MEIKLEIOHN al 94-98.
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this occur, the decision of Virginia Citizens is destined to join Lochner v.
New York as the "twentieth century archetype of a judicial mistake."
45
Paul Preston
STATE PROTECTION OF THE VIABLE UNBORN CHILD AFTER ROE V. WADE:
How LITTLE, How LATE?
In 1974, Missouri enacted a statute prohibiting the abortion of a viable
fetus, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.'
Viability was defined as "that stage of fetal development when the life of
the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural
or artificial life-supportive systems." 2 Two physicians sued for injunctive
and declaratory relief, claiming that abortion could not constitutionally be
prohibited prior to the 28th week of gestation. The United States Supreme
Court held that a state may prohibit the abortion of a fetus which might
survive outside the womb, regardless of the period of gestation, unless the
abortion is necessary to preserve maternal life or health. Planned Parent-
hood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).'
Until recently, regulation and prohibition of abortion were generally
thought to be constitutionally within the police power of the states. Abortion
had been a crime at common law, 4 and specific anti-abortion statutes were
45. STEPHENSEN, supra note 37, at 218.
1. VERNON'S ANN. MO. STAT. §§ 188.010 - .085 (Supp. 1975), enacted by
Missouri Laws 1974, p. 809 §§ 1-16.
2. Id. § 188.015(3) (Supp. 1975), enacted by Missouri Laws 1974, p. 809 § 2(3).
3. The Court's treatment of the following subjects in the instant case is not
discussed in this Note: standing, state requirement of a woman's "informed
consent" prior to an abortion, state requirement of spousal consent prior to an
abortion, state requirement of parental consent prior to an abortion performed upon
an unmarried minor, and reporting and record-keeping requirements. The Court's
holding on a state prohibition of the saline amniocentesis method of abortion after the
first 12 weeks of gestation is discussed in the text at notes 62-68, infra. The Court's
holding on a state requirement that a physician take measures to preserve a fetus' life
and health during abortion is discussed in the text at notes 58-61, infra.
4. 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *50; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129; 2 H.
BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE *279. But the Court ex-
pressed uncertainty as to whether the common law regarded abortion as homicide,
or a lesser crime, or never "firmly established" as a crime at all, in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 132-36 (1973). The Court relied heavily on Means, The Phoenix of
Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise
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